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I. Introduction
The death penalty is the most severe punishment that can
be administered in our society. It presents a moral tension be-
tween those who view it as the ultimate deterrent factor and
those who view it as a brutal and unjustified punishment.
What remains clear is that any law providing for such severe
punishment must be administered in compliance with the Con-
stitution of the United States. Ironically, evidence of the uncon-
stitutionality of the New York death penalty has been provided
by the very people who have the responsibility to implement the
death penalty-the district attorneys themselves. 2 In formulat-
ing the policies of their offices, some district attorneys have es-
sentially ignored the purpose of the New York death penalty
legislation3 and have decided to advance their own personal be-
2. See infra notes 5-22 and accompanying text.
3. See infra note 253 and accompanying text.
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liefs over the desires of the people by not seeking the death pen-
alty in cases where it is applicable. 4
Bronx County District Attorney Robert T. Johnson is a vo-
cal opponent of the death penalty statute in New York. 5 Dis-
trict Attorney Johnson has voiced his intent to exercise his
discretion and pursue life imprisonment without parole in cases
that qualify for the death penalty.6 Personal reasons, such as
his upbringing and respect for the value of life, and his experi-
ence of prosecuting and convicting an innocent man of inten-
tional murder are given as explanations of this policy. 7 District
Attorney Johnson sees many uncertainties in the legislation
and questions whether juries will impose the penalty, whether
its application will be fair, whether the defendant will actually
be executed and whether others will be deterred.8 In light of the
tremendous cost of the trials and appeals in capital cases and
these uncertainties, Mr. Johnson states that the money could be
better spent by increasing the number of judges and courtrooms
and establishing crime fighting and prevention programs. 9
However, other district attorneys who are also personally
opposed to the death penalty intend to consider the death pen-
alty in the appropriate cases.' 0 Queens County District Attor-
ney Richard A. Brown states that it is his "responsibility" to
carry out the mandate of the Legislature." He intends to util-
ize the broad discretion that the legislation provides to prosecu-
tors, as well as the guidance and eligibility requirements, in a
fair and just manner. 12
4. See infra notes 5-9 and accompanying text.
5. See Letter from Robert T. Johnson, District Attorney, Bronx County District
Attorney's Office, to Kerry E. Ford, Associate, Pace Law Review (March 7, 1995) (on
file with the Pace Law Review).
6. See id.
7. See id.
8. See id.
9. See id.
10. See infra notes 11-17 and accompanying text.
11. Letter from Richard A. Brown, District Attorney, Queens County District
Attorney's Office, to Kerry E. Ford, Associate, Pace Law Review (Jan. 3, 1996) (on
fie with the Pace Law Review).
12. See id.
1996] 275
3
PACE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 17:273
Also personally opposed to the law is Charles J. Hynes,
Brooklyn County District Attorney.'3 Although his personal be-
liefs are at odds with the legislation, Hynes indicates that he is
required due to his oath, the obligations of his office, and the
standards for prosecutors nationwide, to uphold the laws of
New York, including the death penalty law, in a fair-minded
way.14 It is not the role of a prosecutor, nor is it within their
power, to legislate by adopting policies that change the intent of
those who make the laws for society.' 5 In anticipation of the
first death penalty case in Brooklyn, Hynes has formed a special
team of fifteen prosecutors to handle such cases.'6 New York
County District Attorney Robert M. Morgenthau stated that it
is within the discretion of the district attorney whether or not to
seek the death penalty and that he intends to exercise that dis-
cretion wisely.' 7
Johnson's policy is not pleasing many leaders in New York,
especially when he declared that he would not seek the death
penalty for Michael Vernon, a man accused of killing five people
13. See Letter from Charles J. Hynes, District Attorney, Kings County District
Attorney's Office, to Kerry E. Ford, Associate, Pace Law Review (Jan. 23, 1996) (on
file with the Pace Law Review). "I have stated publicly and often my belief that life
imprisonment without parole is a more appropriate and effective penalty than cap-
ital punishment." Id. at 1.
14. See id. According to the New York State Constitution, Article XIII § 13,
the duty of the District Attorney is "to conduct all prosecutions for crimes and
offenses cognizable by the courts of the county for which he or she shall have been
elected .... " Id. A district attorney represents the people of the State and the
State's legal system. See id. at 2.
15. See id. If a prosecutor believes that a change in the law is appropriate, he
or she may vocalize such a position and work towards that goal, but must remem-
ber that the process of change belongs to the legislature. See id.
16. See id. It is the policy of Hynes' Office to investigate thoroughly each case
where first degree murder may be charged and to seek input from the defense
concerning any mitigating factors before deciding whether to seek death or life
imprisonment without parole. See id. All such information is presented to a com-
mittee of attorneys from the Kings County District Attorney's Office representing
the diversity of the county. See id. This committee evaluates the information
available and recommends to District Attorney Hynes which sentence should be
sought in a particular case. See id.
17. See Letter from Robert M. Morgenthau, District Attorney, New York
County District Attorney's Office, to Kerry E. Ford, Associate, Pace Law Review
(Jan. 22, 1996) (on file with the Pace Law Review). District Attorney Morgenthau
declined further comment on this issue because his office currently has a first de-
gree murder case pending. See id.
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while robbing a Bronx shoestore.18 Vernon is clearly eligible for
the death penalty because he committed murder in the course of
committing a robbery. 19 Calling such a decision "arbitrary and
capricious," New York Senator Guy Velella, the Bronx Republi-
can leader, has voiced his displeasure with Johnson's decision. 20
Velella believes that such snap decisions could jeopardize the
validity of the death penalty statute in New York since
criminals sentenced to death in other counties could argue that
the statute is unconstitutional because if there is no death pen-
alty in the Bronx there is no equal protection under the law.21
Governor Pataki also had "grave reservations" about Johnson's
decision and considered replacing him because he was con-
cerned that the law was not being "faithfully executed" by John-
son as the State Constitution requires of all public officials.22
Considering the number of murders that occur in certain
counties of New York, it is reasonable to question how fairly the
death penalty will be administered if some of those counties fail
to utilize it.23 The result of these policies is the unequal admin-
istration of the death penalty in different counties because of
the district attorney's predetermined policies regarding when
and if the death penalty will be implemented. An equal protec-
tion violation surfaces when a murderer in one New York
county faces death as a punishment but a murderer in another
New York county faces only life imprisonment because of a pol-
icy announced by an individual district attorney.
Part II of this comment will discuss the meaning and his-
torical development of the prohibition against the use of "cruel
and unusual punishments" 24 under the Eighth Amendment.
Part III will address the history of capital punishment in the
18. See Gregg Birnbaum, Gov To D.A.s: Seek Death - Or Else, N.Y. POST, Dec.
22, 1995, at 30 [hereinafter Birnbaum].
19. See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.27(a)(vii) (McKinney Supp. 1996).
20. Ray Kerrison, Bronx DA Will be the Death of True Justice, N.Y. POST, Dec.
22, 1995, at 30.
21. See id.
22. Birnbaum, supra note 18; see also supra note 14.
23. According to Police Department statistics, Brooklyn led New York City in
1994 with 548 murders, the Bronx followed with 514, Queens had 275 and there
were 25 murders in Staten Island. See Patricia Hurtado, Hynes, Reluctantly Will
Ask for Death Task Force in Studying Which Offenders Will Face Executioner,
NEWSDAY, Apr. 30, 1995, at A64.
24. U.S. CONsT. amend. VIII.
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United States from the common law to the present. Part IV will
examine the Fourteenth Amendment and its Equal Protection
Clause. Part IV further discusses purposeful discrimination
and the impact of prosecutorial discretion. Part V focuses on
specific provisions of the New York death penalty legislation.
Part VI addresses the constitutionality of the New York death
penalty legislation. The final part of the Comment will conclude
that the selective enforcement of the death penalty by district
attorneys, according to their individual policies, is a violation of
the Equal Protection Clause.
II. The History of the Eighth Amendment
A. The Origins and Purpose of the Clause
After the Norman Conquest of England in 1066, the system
of penalties which ensured equality between the punishment
and the crime disappeared, replaced with a discretionary
amercement. 25 Although the discretionary aspect of amerce-
ments allowed the individual circumstances of a case to be con-
sidered in the punishment, it also provided an opportunity for
the levying of excessive fines.26 The phrase "cruel and unusual
punishments" first appeared in the English Bill of Rights, en-
acted December 16, 1689, and was primarily directed at curbing
the selective or irregular application of harsh penalties as well
as forbidding arbitrary and discriminatory punishments.2 7
The Eighth Amendment states that, "[e]xcessive bail shall
not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unu-
sual punishments inflicted."28 The basic concept underlying
25. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 242-43 (1972) (per curiam) (Doug-
las, J., concurring) (citing Anthony F. Granucci, "Nor Cruel and Unusual Punish-
ments Inflicted:" The Original Meaning, 57 CAL. L. REV. 839 (1969)). An
amercement is the infliction of a penalty at the discretion of the court. See WEB-
STER'S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 83 (2d ed. 1957). It differs from a fine in
that a fine is, or was originally, a fixed and certain sum prescribed by statute for
an offense, whereas an amercement is discretionary. See id.
26. See Furman, 408 U.S. at 243 (Douglas, J., concurring) (citing Anthony F.
Granucci, "Nor Cruel and Unusual Punishments Inflicted:" The Original Meaning,
57 CAL. L. REV. 839 (1969)).
27. See id. at 242-43 (citing Anthony F. Granucci, "Nor Cruel and Unusual
Punishments Inflicted:" The Original Meaning, 57 CAL. L. REV. at 845-46 (1969)).
28. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. The Eighth Amendment is applicable to the
states through the Fourteenth Amendment. See Robinson v. California, 370 U.S.
660 (1962).
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this amendment is the assurance that the states' power to pun-
ish will "be exercised within the limits of civilized standards" to
maintain the dignity of man.29 In democratic societies, it is the
legislature, not the courts, that respond to the will and the
moral values of the people.30 Therefore, this clause requires
legislatures to write evenhanded, nonselective and nonarbi-
trary penal laws, and requires judges to see that the laws are
applied as such.31
B. "Cruel and Unusual" in the United States
In adopting the "cruel and unusual" language from the
English Bill of Rights, the framers of the Eighth Amendment
intended to limit the legislature's power to proscribe punish-
ments for crimes, 32 and to prohibit torture and other barbaric
punishments. 33 The Supreme Court did not limit the prohibition
against "cruel and unusual" punishment to those methods con-
sidered barbaric in the eighteenth century but have adopted a
flexible approach to the amendment.3 4 The Court recognized
that "a principle to be vital, must be capable of wider applica-
tion than the mischief which gave it birth."35 Therefore, the
clause may acquire a new or different meaning as society and
public opinion change and become enlightened by humane jus-
tice.3 6 However, the central focus remains on the idea that "the
State, even as it punishes, must treat its members with respect
for their intrinsic worth as human beings."37
C. "Cruel and Unusual" and Capital Punishment
The first cases raising Eighth Amendment claims focused
on particular methods used to inflict the death penalty to deter-
29. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100 (1958).
30. See Furman, 408 U.S. at 383 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
31. See id. at 256 (Douglas, J., concurring).
32. See id. at 263 (Brennan, J., concurring).
33. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976); see also Wilkerson v. Utah, 99
U.S. 130 (1878) (forbidding the use of torture or punishments of unnecessary cru-
elty); In Re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 446 (1890) (prohibiting punishments involving
lingering death).
34. See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 171.
35. Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 373 (1910).
36. See id. at 378.
37. Furman, 408 U.S. at 270 (Brennan, J., concurring).
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mine if they were cruel and unusual.38 In Wilkerson v. Utah,39
the petitioner was convicted of premeditated murder in the ter-
ritory of Utah and was sentenced by the presiding justice to
death by public shooting.40 The Supreme Court upheld this
method citing the power of the territory to define offenses and
prescribe the punishment of the offenders within the limits of
the provision against cruel and unusual punishments. 41 At that
time, shooting as a mode of punishment was not considered
cruel and unusual and was used by the military for various
offenses.42
In Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber,43 the petitioner,
convicted of murder, was placed in the electric chair and the
switch was thrown but because of a mechanical failure, death
did not result.44 The petitioner was returned to jail and a sec-
ond death warrant was issued by the Governor.45 The peti-
tioner claimed that he endured the psychological strain of
preparation for electrocution, and to require him to undergo
this preparation again amounted to cruel and unusual punish-
ment.46 The Supreme Court held that there was no violation of
the Eighth Amendment, stating that the Constitution protects
against cruelty inherent in the method of punishment, not the
necessary suffering involved in extinguishing life humanely. 47
The Court reasoned that although an accident prevented the
38. See Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459, 464 (1947); In Re
Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 447 (1890); Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130 (1878).
39. 99 U.S. 130 (1878).
40. See id. The laws of the territory of Utah provided that every person con-
victed of murder in the first degree shall suffer death but did not provide the spe-
cific method to be employed. See id. at 132. The duty to pass sentence was upon
the court. See id.
41. Id. at 133.
42. See id. at 134. For mutiny, desertion, and other military crimes the
method of punishment employed was shooting. See id.
43. 329 U.S. 459 (1947).
44. See id. at 459, 460.
45. See id. at 460-61.
46. See id. at 464. See In Re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436 (1890). In Kemmler, the
petitioner claimed that electrocution constituted cruel and unusual punishment.
See id. at 443. The Supreme Court upheld this method of execution stating that
the use of electricity is not barbaric and results in instantaneous and painless
death. See id.
47. See Kemmler, 136 U.S. at 443.
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success of the first attempt, it did not add an element of cruelty
to the subsequent execution.48
In Weems v. United States49 the Supreme Court expanded
the scope of the amendment when it considered whether
chained imprisonment for a minimum of twelve years at hard
and painful labor, the loss of civil rights, and lifetime surveil-
lance, was a proportional punishment for the crime of falsifying
an official document. 50 In holding such punishment to be cruel
and unusual the Court did not focus on the cruelty or pain pres-
ent in the punishment, but instead upon the lack of proportion-
ality between the crime and the punishment.51 Therefore, any
analysis under the Eighth Amendment must consider whether
the punishment involves the unnecessary and wanton infliction
of pain,52 as well as whether it is grossly out of proportion to the
severity of the crime.53
In ruling on these methods the Supreme Court implicitly
asserted that death as a punishment was valid in certain cir-
cumstances and did not violate the Eighth Amendment.M How-
ever, it was not until Furman v. Georgia55 that the Supreme
Court squarely confronted the claim that death is per se cruel
and unusual punishment.5 6 To decide this question the Furman
Court relied on the history of both the Eighth Amendment and
capital punishment.57
48. See id.
49. 217 U.S. 349 (1910).
50. See id.
51. See id. at 366-67. See also Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 126-27 (1958),
where the Supreme Court held that taking away the citizenship of a person con-
victed by court martial of desertion from the United States Army constituted cruel
and unusual punishment. The Court acknowledged that fines, and even execution,
may be selected as punishment depending on the seriousness of the crime. See id.
at 100.
52. Furman, 408 U.S. at 382-83 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
53. Weems, 217 U.S. at 366-67.
54. Furman, 408 U.S. at 285 (Brennan, J., concurring).
55. 408 U.S. 238.
56. Id. See infra notes 69-85.
57. Furman, 408 U.S. at 255 (Douglas, J., concurring).
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III. The History of Capital Punishment
A. Common Law - 1971
The death penalty is said to have two purposes: retribution
and deterrence. 58 It has been employed throughout history to
punish individuals for their crimes.59 At common law, a
mandatory death sentence was imposed on all convicted mur-
derers, but in the United States there has been, from the begin-
ning, a "rebellion against the common law rule imposing a
mandatory death sentence on all convicted murderers."60 As a
result, many states attempted to restrict the death penalty by
narrowing the class of murders to be punished by death.61 How-
ever, in those cases the juries simply took the law into their own
hands by refusing to convict the defendant of the capital of-
fense, thus avoiding sentencing the defendant to death.62
Rather than refining the defined capital offenses, the legisla-
tures, recognizing the necessity of juries being able to recom-
mend mercy in some cases, simply granted the juries the
discretion to do so.63 The entire question of when to impose cap-
ital punishment was for the jury alone to decide. 64
In McGautha v. California,65 the Supreme Court held that
complete jury discretion to pronounce life or death was within
constitutional bounds.66 The Court reasoned that the states
were allowed to assume that jurors confronted with the impor-
tant task of deciding whether a person lives or dies, will only
make such a decision after considering a variety of factors in-
cluding the consequences of their decision.67 The Court rejected
58. See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 183.
59. See Thop, 356 U.S. at 99.
60. McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 198 (1971).
61. See id. at 198.
62. See id. at 199.
63. See id.
64. See Winston v. United States, 172 U.S. 303, 312-13 (1899). In Winston,
the Supreme Court reversed a murder conviction in which the trial judge in-
structed the jury that it should not return a recommendation of mercy unless it
found mitigating factors existed. See id. at 313. In so holding, the Court declared
that the defendant's characteristics, the irrevocability of the sentence of death or
any apprehension that all the facts had not been presented were for the jury alone
to consider. See id.
65. 402 U.S. 183 (1971).
66. See id. at 207.
67. See id. at 207-08.
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the argument that such discretion should be given only where
standards to guide the decision are also provided.68
B. The Modern View: 1971 - Present
1. Furman v. Georgia 69
The Supreme Court greatly affected the future of death
penalty legislation in its per curiam decision in Furman.70
Three cases were consolidated in Furman7' where the limited
issue before the court was whether the imposition and carrying
out of the death penalty in cases where the jury exercised com-
plete discretion to impose or withhold the death penalty consti-
tuted cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth
and Fourteenth Amendments. 72 Adopting the dissent of Justice
Brennan in McGautha, the Supreme Court in Furman declared
unconstitutional a Georgia death penalty statute because it
failed to provide juries with guidance and procedures to follow
when they are called on to sentence a defendant in a capital
case.
73
In his concurring opinion, Justice Douglas wrote that stat-
utes which provide untrammeled discretion to juries in sentenc-
ing a defendant in a capital case were unconstitutional in their
operation,74 reasoning that "[t]hey are pregnant with discrimi-
nation and discrimination is an ingredient not compatible with
the idea of equal protection of the laws that is implicit in the
ban on 'cruel and unusual' punishments." 75 When a severe pun-
68. See id. The dissent wrote that the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process
Clause would render unconstitutional any capital sentencing procedures that are
constructed to allow variation from one case to another without any mechanism to
prevent those variations from causing random and arbitrary decisions. See id. at
248-49 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
69. 408 U.S. 238 (1972)(per curiam).
70. Id.
71. Furman v. Georgia, 167 S.E.2d 628 (1969); Jackson v. Georgia, 171 S.E.2d
(1969); Branch v. Texas, 447 S.W.2d 932 (1969).
72. See Furman, 408 U.S. at 239-40.
73. See id at 247 n.11. (Douglas, J., concurring); id. at 294-95, 305-06 (Bren-
nan, J., concurring); id. at 309-10 (Stewart, J., concurring); id. at 313-14 (White, J.,
concurring); id. at 365 (Marshall, J., concurring).
74. See id. at 256-57 (Douglas, J., concurring).
75. Id. at 257. Justice Douglas wrote that allowing discretion to judges and
juries allows the death penalty statute to be selectively applied, feeding prejudices
against the accused if he is poor, despised, lacking in political clout or a member of
a minority. See id. at 255.
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ishment is inflicted in a majority of the cases, it is unlikely that
it is being inflicted arbitrarily.7 6 If, however, the infliction of
the punishment is different from what is usually done, it is a
fair indication that the punishment is being arbitrarily admin-
istered.77 Without provisions to guide the jury in their decision,
the result was that the death penalty was being imposed dis-
criminatorily, 78 wantonly and freakishly,79 and so infre-
quently80 that it was "cruel and unusual."81
Although recognizing that death as a punishment is unique
in its severity and irrevocability, the Court did not decide the
issue of whether capital punishment per se violated the Consti-
tution's ban on "cruel and unusual punishments."8 2 The peti-
tioner's argument that the standards of decency had developed
to such a point that society no longer tolerated capital punish-
ment was accepted by two justices who would have held it per
se unconstitutional.8 3 Four justices would have held that capital
punishment is not unconstitutional per se,84 and three, while
agreeing that the statutes in Furman were invalid as applied,
refused to decide the question of whether such punishment
should never be imposed.88
2. Gregg v. Georgia 86
Following Furman, Georgia amended its death penalty
statute in an effort to cure the constitutional infirmities found
by the Furman Court.8 7 The Supreme Court had the opportu-
76. See id. at 276 (Brennan, J., concurring).
77. See id. at 276-77.
78. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 242 (1972) (per curiam) (Douglas, J.,
concurring).
79. See id. at 310 (Stewart, J., concurring).
80. See id. at 311 (White, J., concurring).
81. See id. at 312.
82. See id. at 396-402 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
83. See id. at 257 (Brennan, J., concurring); id. at 314 (Marshall, J.,
concurring).
84. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 375 (1972) (per curiam) (Burger, C.J.,
dissenting); id. at 405 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); id. at 414 (Powell, J., dissent-
ing); id. at 465 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
85. See id. at 240 (Douglas, J., concurring); id. at 306 (Stewart, J., concur-
ring); id. at 310 (White, J., concurring).
86. 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
87. See id. at 180.
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nity to rule on the amended statute in Gregg v. Georgia.8 The
Georgia Legislature narrowed the class of murderers subject to
the death penalty by statutorily specifying aggravating circum-
stances, one of which must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt
before the jury could impose a death sentence.8 9 Such factors
called on the jury to consider the circumstances of the crime,90
and the characteristics of the criminal. 91 The jury was still af-
forded discretion in sentencing but could no longer decide
whether a defendant should live or die without guidance or di-
rection, as they did before the Furman decision.92 As an addi-
tional safeguard against the arbitrary imposition of the death
penalty, the Georgia statute also provided automatic appeal of
all death sentences to the State's Supreme Court.93 The Court
would decide whether the sentence was imposed due to preju-
dice, whether the evidence supported the jury's finding of an ag-
gravating factor and whether the sentence was disproportionate
to sentences imposed in other cases.94
The Supreme Court stated that the concerns expressed in
Furman could therefore "be met by a carefully drafted statute
that ensure[s] that the sentencing [body] is given adequate in-
formation and guidance." 95 The Court found that these con-
cerns would best be met by a system that provides for a
bifurcated proceeding where the sentencing body is given all the
information that is relevant to the imposition of the sentence
and is provided with standards to guide its use of the informa-
tion.96 However, the Court recognized that procedures other
88. See id. at 162-63.
89. See id. at 197. In addition to the statutorily defined aggravating factors,
the statute also allowed other relevant mitigating or aggravating factors to be con-
sidered. See id. at 197.
90. See id. These considerations included, but were not limited to, whether
the crime of murder was committed in the course of another capital felony,
whether it was a peace officer who was murdered, and whether it was committed
in a particularly heinous manner. See id.
91. See id. These characteristics might include whether the defendant has
prior convictions and whether special facts exist that mitigate against imposing
the death penalty, such as youth, extent of cooperation with the police, or emo-
tional state. See id.
92. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 197-98 (1976).
93. See id.
94. See id.
95. Id. at 195.
96. See id.
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than those set forth in Gregg may satisfy the concerns in
Furman and that each distinct sentencing system would have to
be looked at individually. 97
Citing the historical use of the death penalty,98 the text of
the Constitution,9 and the case law of the Supreme Court,100
the Court answered the question of whether death as a punish-
ment was always unconstitutional in the negative.'10 The Court
stated that American society still regards capital punishment
as an appropriate punishment as evidenced by the legislative
response to the Furman decision. 0 2 The death penalty statutes
enacted after Furman addressed the concerns expressed by the
Court in Furman primarily by specifying factors to consider and
procedures to be followed by the jury in deciding whether or not
to impose the death penalty. 10 3
The Eighth Amendment is only one of the constitutional
limitations with which the New York death penalty legislation
must comply in order to be deemed constitutional.'14 The Four-
teenth Amendment and its Equal Protection Clause are two ad-
97. See id.
98. See supra Part III.A.
99. The Fifth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments all contemplate the use of
the death penalty in their language. The Fifth Amendment reads that "[n]o person
shall be held to answer for a capital ... crime, unless on a presentment or indict-
ment of a Grand Jury... ." U.S. CONST. amend. V. The Eighth Amendment pro-
vides that "[e]xcessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor
cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. The Four-
teenth Amendment reads, ". . . nor shall any State deprive any person of life....
without due process of law." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
100. See, e.g., Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130; In Re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436;
Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459.
101. See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 187.
102. See id. at 179-80. After Furman at least 35 states enacted death penalty
statutes for at least some crimes that result in the death of another. See id.
103. See id. at 179.
104. See Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 597 (1977); see also, e.g., Eddings v.
Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 (1982) (death penalty sentence imposed against 16 year
old reversed as "cruel and unusual" pursuant to Eighth Amendment where un-
happy childhood and possible emotional disturbance were not considered as miti-
gating factors); Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989) (Eighth Amendment
requires that retardation be considered as mitigating factor to avoid "cruel and
unusual" punishment); Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 378-80 (1989) (death
penalty imposed on 16 year old is not a per se violation of Eighth Amendment's bar
on "cruel and unusual" punishment).
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ditional limitations. 0 5  The enactment of the Fourteenth
Amendment provided additional safeguards against arbitrary
state laws, including death penalty laws.10°
IV. The Fourteenth Amendment
A. Restrictions on State Action Prior to the Enactment of the
Fourteenth Amendment
In Barron v. Baltimore0 7 the Supreme Court held that the
Fifth Amendment was only a restriction on the federal govern-
ment and was not binding on the states.'0 8 In Barron, the
Supreme Court reasoned that the amendment demanded secur-
ity against encroachments of the federal government and that
the amendment expressed no intention for it to apply to the
states. 10 9 Barron, a wharf owner, sued the city claiming that
street construction had diverted the stream flow so that it de-
posited silt in front of his wharf, making it too shallow for ves-
sels.1 0 His claim was that this action violated the Fifth
Amendment,"' which provides that private property shall not
be "taken for public use, without just compensation." 112 The
Supreme Court denied his claim that the Fifth Amendment
should be construed to restrain the power of the states, explain-
ing that the Constitution was established collectively by the
people of the United States, for themselves and their own gov-
ernment, rather than for the government of the individual
states. 113
B. The Enactment of the Fourteenth Amendment
Following the decision in Barron, the Fourteenth Amend-
ment 14 was enacted and the Supreme Court had the opportu-
105. See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 345 (1987) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting).
106. See Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420 (1980); see also McGuartha, 420
U.S. at 287 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
107. 32 U.S. 243 (1833).
108. See id. at 247.
109. See id. at 248.
110. See id. at 244.
111. See id. at 247.
112. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
113. See Barron, 32 U.S. at 250-51.
114. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. The amendment provides that:
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nity to interpret it for the first time in The Slaughterhouse
Cases.115 The Supreme Court stated that even on the most cas-
ual examination of the amendment, its purpose was to firmly
establish the freedom of the slaves and protect them from the
oppression that they had endured in the past.1 6 However, in
Strauder v. West Virginia"7 the Supreme Court stated that
there might be times when the amendment may be implicated
for other purposes." 8
Following the enactment of the Fourteenth Amendment, a
new question developed. In light of the fact that the Bill of
Rights was to protect the individual against various forms of
interference by the federal government, the question became
whether the Bill of Rights was applicable to the states through
the Fourteenth Amendment. 19 Cases since The Slaughterhouse
Cases have gradually held that most of the Bill of Rights is ap-
[aill persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State
wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall
abridge the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States; nor
shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal pro-
tection of the laws.
Id.
115. 83 U.S. 36 (1872). These cases concerned a Louisiana law that prohib-
ited livestock yards and slaughterhouses within New Orleans and the immediate
surrounding area. JOHN E. NowAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAw
§ 11.2, at 370-71 (5th ed. 1995). However, an exception to the statute allowed one
company to operate a slaughterhouse in the area. See id. The petitioners brought
an action contending that the monopoly created by the statute violated the Thir-
teenth and Fourteenth Amendments. See id. at 371. The Supreme Court rejected
the Thirteenth Amendment argument reasoning that the amendment was solely
for the purpose of abolishing slavery and was inapplicable in this case. See id. The
Court held that the monopoly created by the legislature did not infringe on the
privileges and immunities of United States citizenship provided for in the Four-
teenth Amendment. See id. The Court also disposed of the due process argument
by holding that the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment did not guar-
antee substantive fairness of laws passed by states. See id. The equal protection
claim was also disposed of by the Court when it held that the Equal Protection
Clause was only intended to protect blacks from discrimination by the states. See
id.
116. See The Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. at 71.
117. 100 U.S. 303 (1879).
118. See id. at 310. See infra notes 125-26 and accompanying text.
119. "No State shall... deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, with-
out due process of law." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
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plicable to the states through the Due Process Clause.1 20 The
only amendments not incorporated in the Fourteenth Amend-
ment are the Second, Third, Seventh and Fifth Amendment re-
quirements of grand jury indictments.121
1. The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment
One provision of the Fourteenth Amendment is the Equal
Protection Clause which states that "[n]o State shall make or
enforce any laws which shall... deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." 122 The central
purpose of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment is to prevent official conduct which discriminates
on the basis of race.123 From the beginning, courts have inter-
preted the Equal Protection Clause to impose "a general re-
straint on the use of classifications, whatever the area
120. See Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897)
(Fifth Amendment right to compensation for property taken by the state); Fiske v.
Kansas, 274 U.S. 380 (1927) (First Amendment rights to freedom of speech, press
and religion); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (Fourth Amendment right to be
free from unreasonable searches and seizures); Robinson v. California, 370 U.S.
660 (1962) (Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punish-
ment); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (Sixth Amendment right to
counsel); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964) (Fifth Amendment right to be free
from self incrimination); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965) (Sixth Amendment
right to confrontation of an opposing witness); Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S.
213 (1967) (right to speedy and public trial); Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14
(1967) (right to compulsory process for obtaining witnesses); Duncan v. Louisiana,
391 U.S. 145 (1968) (Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial); Benton v. Maryland,
395 U.S. 784 (1969) (Fifth Amendment right prohibiting double jeopardy); Schilb v.
Kuebel, 404 U.S. 357 (1971) (Eighth Amendment prohibition against excessive
bail).
121. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
122. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. Although an independent Equal Protection
Clause does not exist in the Fifth Amendment, the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment does contain an equal protection component prohibiting such discrim-
ination on the part of the United States. See Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499
(1954).
123. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976). In this case the
Supreme Court held that recruiting procedures used by the District of Columbia
police force did not violate the Equal Protection Clause. See id. Although the law
had a disproportionate impact on blacks, such impact did not constitute an intent
to discriminate. See id. at 238-41. The Court found that the law established ra-
cially neutral employment qualifications and served the legitimate government
purpose of assuring that only qualified applicants were hired. See id. at 245-46.
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regulated, whatever the classification criteria used."124 There-
fore, the original purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment, to en-
sure the equal treatment for blacks, has been extended broadly
to other areas, including gender 125 and alienage. 126 Its purpose
is to guarantee that people who are similarly situated will be
treated similarly and that those who are not similarly situated
will not be treated similarly. 127
2. The Components of an Equal Protection Challenge
Proof of racially discriminatory intent or purpose is re-
quired to show a violation of the Equal Protection Clause. 128
Such intent to discriminate does not have to be the sole purpose
of the government action; it is enough that it is a motivating
factor in the action.129 However, such purposeful discrimination
may not necessarily appear on the face of the law,130 but may
occur when a facially neutral statute is applied in a purpose-
fully discriminatory manner. 131 A discriminatory purpose may
also be inferred from the totality of the relevant facts, including
the fact that the law has a disproportionate impact on a particu-
lar race.132 However, a law neutral on its face, serving ends that
are within the power of the government to pursue, is not neces-
sarily invalid because it affects a greater proportion of one race
than another. 133 Therefore, disproportionate impact is not irrel-
124. GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 676 (10th ed. 1980).
125. See, e.g., Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971) (the Supreme Court struck
down as violative of the Equal Protection Clause a statute preferring men over
women as administrators of estates).
126. See, e.g., Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982) (a Texas statute which per-
mitted local school districts to deny free education to alien children was held to be
a denial of equal protection because the legislative history of the Clause showed
that it was intended to cover any person physically within the borders of a state).
127. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 16-1, at 1438
(2d ed. 1988).
128. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. at 240. Methods of establishing in-
tent can be in the form of proof of a racially disproportionate impact, historical
background, or legislative or administrative history. Village of Arlington Heights
v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 267, 268 (1977).
129. See Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 265-66.
130. See id. at 266.
131. See Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
132. See Davis, 426 U.S. at 242. The impact of a law may be an important
starting point in determining whether discrimination was a motivating factor in
the enactment of the law. See also Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 266.
133. See Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 265-66.
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evant but, alone, it does not invalidate a law under the Equal
Protection Clause.134 Sometimes, a clear pattern, inexplicable
on grounds other than a purpose to discriminate, may emerge
from the effect of a state action even when a law is neutral on
its face. 135
A prima facie case of an equal protection violation is estab-
lished when three factors are met.136 First, the petitioner must
establish that he is a member of a distinct group that is singled
out for different treatment. 13 7 Second, he must show a substan-
tial amount of differential treatment. 138 The final factor to be
established is that the allegedly discriminatory process is sus-
ceptible to abuse or is not racially neutral. 139 When a prima fa-
cie case of an equal protection violation is established, the
burden shifts to the State to rebut the presumption of unconsti-
tutional action by showing a permissible purpose for the law. 40
3. Methods of Proving Purposeful Discrimination
Determining whether a discriminatory purpose motivated a
particular official course of action requires an analysis of the
circumstantial or direct evidence surrounding the action.' 4'
Whether the action bears a greater impact on one group over
another is a starting point in this analysis. 142 Sometimes the
discriminatory purpose is established in the very words of the
134. See id. at 265. However, the line between discriminatory impact and pur-
pose may not be so clear. See id. at 266. It may be that the most probative evi-
dence of the actor's intent is the objective evidence of what actually happened
rather than evidence describing the subjective state of the actor because it is nor-
mally presumed that an actor intends the natural results of his deeds. See id.
However, a constitutional issue does not arise whenever there is a disproportion-
ate impact, but only when the impact is so pronounced that the effect and purpose
blend together. See id. at 265-66.
135. See id. at 266. See also Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886). Cases
such as these are rare and without a pattern as obvious as that in Yick Wo, impact
alone is not enough and the court must look to other evidence. See Arlington
Heights, 429 U.S. at 266.
136. See Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 494 (1977).
137. See id.
138. See id.
139. See id.
140. See id. at 494-95.
141. See Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 266.
142. See id.; see also Davis, 426 U.S. at 242.
1996]
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challenged statute and sometimes other evidence is needed to
establish the purpose. 143
In Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing De-
velopment Corp. 144the Supreme Court listed types of evidence,
other than statistics, that can be used to prove a discriminatory
purpose. 145 The historical background of the decision is one way
to derive intent, especially by putting focus on whether official
actions were taken for invidious purposes. 14 The specific se-
quence of events leading up to the challenged decision may also
show the decisionmaker's intent. 147 Another method would be
to look at whether normal procedural or substantive sequences
were followed. 148 The legislative or administrative history is
also highly relevant to purpose, such as statements made by
members of the decisionmaking body, minutes from meetings or
reports.149
One of the most important cases regarding capital sentenc-
ing and equal protection is McClesky v. Kemp.150 In McClesky, a
black defendant argued that his death sentence violated the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because
statistical information' 1 showed that petit juries in Georgia im-
143. See Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 266.
144. 429 U.S. 252 (1977). In Arlington Heights, a real estate developer al-
leged that the local authorities refused to rezone a tract of land from a single-
family to a multiple-family classification because of racially discriminatory pur-
poses. See id. at 254. The developer intended to build racially integrated, low to
moderate income housing. See id. at 254-57. The Supreme Court held for the Vil-
lage finding that although the Village's actions arguably caused a greater discrimi-
natory effect on minorities, effect alone was insufficient to establish purposeful
discrimination. See id. at 269-71.
145. See id. at 267-68.
146. See id. at 267.
147. See id. For example, if the tract of land had always been zoned for multi-
ple-family dwellings, but was suddenly changed to single-family zoning when the
town learned of the intent to build integrated housing, that sequence may provide
evidence of intent. See id.
148. See id.
149. See id. at 268.
150. 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
151. The petitioner relied on a statistical study performed by Professors
David C. Baldus, Charles Pulaski and George Woodworth which purported to show
a disparity in the imposition of the death penalty in Georgia based on the race of
the murder victim and the race of the defendant. See id. at 286. The study indi-
cated that defendants charged with killing white people received the death penalty
in 11% of the cases, but defendants charged with killing blacks received the death
penalty in only 1% of the cases. See id. Additionally, the study found that the
292
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posed the death penalty more frequently on those who kill
whites, in particular blacks who murder whites. 15 2 The
Supreme Court held that the statistics offered by the defendant
did not show that in his case, the death penalty was imposed
because of his race. 153 The Court stated that a constitutional
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment requires the defendant
to show the existence of purposeful discrimination and that
such discrimination had a discriminatory effect on the defend-
ant in his case. 54 The Court reasoned that because the statis-
tics combined the actions of hundreds of juries whose actions
were taken under different situations, they did not establish
that the jury in the defendant's case acted discriminatorily. 155
However, the Court did acknowledge that in certain con-
texts statistics may be a successful method to prove purposeful
discrimination. 156 Although such proof usually must show a
"stark" pattern before acceptance, 15 7 the Court has permitted
statistics of a lesser degree in the context of jury venire selec-
tion 158 and violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964.159 One factor distinguishing cases in which statistics have
been accepted as proof of discriminatory intent despite lack of a
stark pattern is that the statistics are applied to only a limited
number of qualifications, while in a capital sentencing case the
jury can consider a wide variety of factors relevant to the de-
fendant's background, character and the offense. 60 Therefore,
the application of an inference drawn from general statistics to
death penalty was imposed in 22% of the cases involving black defendants and
white victims; 1% of the cases with black defendants and black victims; and 3% of
the cases involving white defendants and black victims. See id. Baldus also found
that prosecutors sought the death penalty in 70% of the cases where the victim
was white and the defendant was black; 32% of the cases involving white defend-
ants and victims; 15% of the cases involving black defendants and black victims;
and 19% of the cases involving white defendants and black victims. See id. at 287.
152. See id. at 286-87.
153. See id. at 292-93, 297.
154. See id. at 292.
155. See id. at 294-95 & n.15.
156. See McClesky v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 293-94 (1987).
157. See id. at 293; see also Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 266; and see, e.g.,
Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960).
158. See McClesky, 481 U.S. at 294 (quoting Arlington Heights v. Metropoli-
tan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266 n.13).
159. See id. at 294.
160. See id.
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a specific and complicated decision in a capital case is not the
same as the application of an inference in the type of decision
which considers only a few factors or qualifications. 161 Another
difference is that in venire selection and Title VII contexts, the
decisionmaker has an opportunity to explain the statistical dis-
parity. 162 In McClesky, the State had no opportunity to rebut
the statistics because of the public policy that jurors not be
called to testify regarding the motives and influences that led to
their decision. 163
4. Types of Purposeful Discrimination
a. Facially Discriminatory
In Strauder v. West Virginia64 the Supreme Court found
unconstitutional a statute which permitted only white male citi-
zens to serve as jurors. 6 5 The petitioner was convicted of mur-
der by an all white jury and on appeal he alleged that such a
conviction was rendered in violation of the Equal Protection
Clause.166 In holding the statute invalid, the Supreme Court fo-
cused on the purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment and found
that the statute failed to protect black defendants against the
prejudice of white jurors. 67 The Court pointed out that while a
black defendant did not have a right to a trial before an all
black jury, 68 he did have the right to a jury composed of people
selected without discrimination against his color. 69 To deny
people the right to participate as jurors because of their race is
an impediment to securing that race-equal justice under the
laws. 170 Where the equal protection claim is based on an overtly
discriminated class it has been found that it is not necessary to
show discriminatory intent.' 71
161. See id. at 294-95.
162. See id. at 296.
163. See id.
164. 100 U.S. 303 (1879).
165. See id.
166. See id. at 304.
167. See id. at 306-09.
168. See id. at 309.
169. See id. at 305.
170. See Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 308 (1879).
171. See id. at 303.
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In Snowden v. Hughes172 the petitioner was a Republican
candidate in a primary election in which, according to a stat-
ute,173 the two Republican candidates with the most votes and
the Democrat with the most votes were to be nominated. 7 4 The
petitioner was one of the two candidates with the most votes but
his name was not submitted. 175 Petitioner alleged that the re-
spondents, members of the Illinois State Canvassing Board,
willfully, maliciously and arbitrarily failed to file petitioner's
name with the Secretary of State as required and that such ac-
tion deprived him of the nomination and constituted unequal
administration of the laws. 176 The Supreme Court held that the
respondents' actions, although constituting state action within
the prohibitions of the Fourteenth Amendment, did not violate
the Equal Protection Clause because they were not shown to be
purposely discriminatory and were based on a permissible
classification. 177
b. Statutes Enacted with the Purpose to
Discriminate
Personnel Administrator v. Feeney178 presented to the
Supreme Court the question of whether Massachusetts' veter-
ans' preference statute 79 discriminated against women in viola-
tion of the Equal Protection Clause. 80 Under the statute all
veterans who qualified for state civil service positions had to be
172. 321 U.S. 1 (1944).
173. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 46, § 8-13 (repealed 1982).
174. See Snowden, 321 U.S. at 39.
175. See id.
176. See id. at 4.
177. See id. at 8-9. Where, as here, a statute requires official action which
discriminates between a successful and an unsuccessful candidate, it is permissi-
ble and is not a violation of the Equal Protection Clause. See id. at 8.
178. 442 U.S. 256 (1979).
179. MAss. GEN. LAwS ANN., ch. 31 (1932) (current version at MASS. GEN.
LAws. ANN. ch. 31, § 26 (West 1979)).
180. See Personnel Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 259 (1979). The federal
government and virtually all the states afford some hiring preference to veterans.
See id. at 261. The Massachusetts statute was one of the most generous in that it
applied to all civil service jobs, was available to men or women, including nurses,
who were honorably discharged from the United States Armed Forces after at least
ninety days of service, one day of which was during wartime. See id. at 261-62.
The preference could be exercised at any time, as many times as the veteran
wanted. See id. at 262.
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considered for appointment before qualifying nonveterans.' 8 '
The petitioner, a female nonveteran, argued that the preference
excluded women from the most desirable civil service jobs. 8 2
Although the statute attempted to include as many women vet-
erans as possible, it overwhelmingly favored men. 8 3 The
district court found that although the absolute preference stat-
ute was not enacted to discriminate against women, it did have
a devastating effect on their employment opportunities.'84 In
holding the absolute preference unconstitutional, the district
court stated that a more limited form of preference would serve
the state's interest in aiding veterans and could be
constitutional. 85
The Supreme Court found the issue to be whether the ap-
pellee showed that the statute was shaped by a gender-based
discriminatory purpose. 8 6 Citing the findings of the district
court, the Supreme Court held that although any statute favor-
ing veterans is inherently gender-based, the Massachusetts
statute was not enacted with the purpose to discriminate
against women.'8 7 Discriminatory purpose implies that the deci-
sionmaker selected or reaffirmed a particular course of conduct
at least in part "because of," not merely "in spite of," its adverse
181. See id. at 259. These preference statutes are generally justified as a re-
ward to veterans for their sacrifice in military service, to ease the transition to
civilian life, to encourage service and to attract loyal people to civil service posi-
tions. See id. at 265.
182. See id. at 264. During a twelve year tenure as a public employee the
petitioner took and passed several civil service exams. See id. Those who pass the
examinations are ranked according to score on an eligibility list and when posi-
tions become available the top ranking people on the list are considered. See id. at
263. Due to the preference given veterans, Ms. Feeney found herself behind them
on the list even though her scores were higher than many of the veterans. See id.
at 264.
183. See id. at 269. When the litigation began, over 98% of veterans in Massa-
chusetts were men; only 1.8% were female and over one quarter of the Massachu-
setts population were veterans. See id. at 270. This imbalance is due in part to the
restrictions on the number of women who could enlist in the United States Armed
Forces and the fact that women were never included in the draft. See id. at 269-70.
184. See id. at 260.
185. See Personnel Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 260 (1979).
186. See id. at 276.
187. See id. at 276-77. The Court felt that any statute favoring veterans
would necessarily be discriminatory against women because of historical, gender-
based, military practices. See id.
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effects on an identifiable group. 18 In this case, the statute was
enacted to benefit all veterans, and adversely affected both wo-
men and men who were not veterans. 8 9 Therefore, because all
nonveterans were treated alike, male or female, there was no
equal protection violation.
c. Discrimination Through Enforcement
Sometimes a clear pattern, inexplicable on grounds other
than race, emerges from the effect of government action in car-
rying out a statute that is neutral on its face.190 An example of
this is illustrated in Yick Wo v. Hopkins.191 In Yick Wo, a San
Francisco city ordinance prohibited the establishment or main-
tenance of certain laundries without the permission from the
Board of Supervisors. 192 The permission was not necessary if
the laundry was constructed out of stone or brick. 193 The peti-
tioner, a native of China, had a laundry business in the same
building for twenty-two years, as well as a license from the
board of fire wardens and the health inspector approving the
use and safety of the building for a laundry business. 94 The city
of San Francisco had, at that time, 320 laundries, 240 of which
were owned and operated by Chinese and 310 of the total were
constructed of wood. 195
The petitioner alleged that 150 Chinese were arrested for
maintaining laundries without the consent of the Board of Su-
pervisors while eighty non-Chinese owners, also lacking the ap-
propriate consent, were not arrested.196 The Supreme Court
found that the Board of Supervisor's authority to grant or with-
hold consent was not exercised upon consideration of the cir-
cumstances of each case but was a purely arbitrary power
exercised without guidance and at the mere will of the Board
members.197 Rather than prescribe a rule and conditions for the
188. Id. at 279.
189. See id. at 280.
190. See Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 266.
191. 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
192. See id. at 357.
193. See id.
194. See id. at 358.
195. See id. at 358-59.
196. See id. at 359.
197. See Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 366-67 (1886).
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regulation of laundries to which all similarly situated owners
had to conform, the rule arbitrarily created two classes: those
permitted to use the wooden buildings and those who were re-
fused consent at the will of the Board.198 The Court further
stated that although a law may appear fair on its face, if it is
applied and administered unequally by public officials in a way
that makes unjust and illegal discriminations between persons
in similar circumstances, it is a denial of justice and is prohib-
ited by the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution.199
Discrimination through the enforcement of a statute is not
always as clear as it was in Yick Wo. Sometimes,
discrimination through enforcement is masqueraded as
prosecutorial discretion.200 However, cases have acknowledged
that the use of prosecutorial discretion may also be a weapon of
discrimination. 20 1
Prosecutorial discretion is intertwined in many equal pro-
tection claims because "the power to be lenient [also] is the
power to discriminate."20 2 Our criminal justice system affords
the government broad discretion as to whom to prosecute 2 3 so
abuse must be clear in order to find such discretion in violation
of the Constitution.20 4 "Mere failure to prosecute other offend-
ers is no basis for a finding of denial of equal protection."20 5
There is no doubt that inherent in this discretion is the poten-
tial for individual and institutional abuse. 206 With this in
mind it should be noted that, although broad, prosecutorial dis-
cretion is not "unfettered" and is subject to constitutional
constraints. 207
198. See id. at 368.
199. See id. at 373-74.
200. See Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357 (1978).
201. See, e.g., id. at 368 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
202. McClesky, 481 U.S. at 312 (quoting KENNETH C. DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY
JUSTICE 170 (1980)).
203. See Bordenkircher, 434 U.S. at 364.
204. See McClesky, 481 U.S. at 296-97.
205. Moss v. Hornig, 314 F.2d 89, 92 (2d Cir. 1963); see also United States v.
Rickenbacker, 309 F.2d 462, 464 (2d Cir. 1962).
206. See Bordenkircher, 434 U.S. at 365.
207. See United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114, 124-25 (1979).
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In Oyler v. Boles, 208 the Supreme Court considered whether
the conscious exercise of some selectivity by state prosecuting
authorities was, in itself, a violation of the equal protection of
the laws. 20 9 The petitioners were serving life sentences im-
posed under the West Virginia habitual criminal statute210
which provided for a mandatory life sentence upon the third
conviction of a crime punishable by imprisonment. 211 The peti-
tioners claimed that their rights to equal protection of the laws
were violated because the law was only applied to a minority of
those subject to its provisions. 212 Petitioners contended that the
habitual criminal statute imposed a mandatory duty on the
prosecutors to seek the more severe penalty against all people
who come within the statutory requirements but that it was
done in only a minority of the cases.213 The petitioners argued
that this violated the equal protection rights of criminals
against whom the heavier penalty was enforced.214
The Supreme Court denied the petitioners' claim because
the petitioners failed to prove that the disparity in the enforce-
ment of the sentencing scheme was due to anything more than
the unavailability of police records to prosecutors and their lack
of knowledge that they were dealing with a three-time offender,
rather than any intent to discriminate based on an unjustifiable
standard.215 The Court held that "the conscious exercise of
some selectivity in enforcement is not in itself a federal consti-
tutional violation."216
208. 368 U.S. 448 (1962). This appeal consolidated two cases, Oyler v. Boles
and Crabtree v. Boles. See id. at 448.
209. See id. at 456.
210. W. VA. CODE § 6130 (1961) (current version at W. VA. CODE § 61-11-18
(Supp. 1996)).
211. See Qyler, 368 U.S. at 449.
212. See id. at 455. Oyler claimed that six men were eligible for prosecution
as habitual offenders but that he was the only one prosecuted as such. See id.
Crabtree alleged that 904 known offenders throughout West Virginia were not sen-
tenced as required by the mandatory statutes. See id.
213. See id. The Court noted that it was unknown whether the failure to pros-
ecute other offenders was due to a policy decision to proceed in only certain cases
or to a lack of knowledge on the part of prosecutors. See id. at 456.
214. See id. at 455-56.
215. See id. at 456.
216. Id.; see also Moss v. Hornig, 314 F.2d 89 (2d Cir. 1963) (state prosecutor's
decision to prosecute petitioner for violating a Sunday Closing Law and not others
was not a denial of equal protection).
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A similar selective enforcement challenge was presented to
the Supreme Court in Wayte v. United States.217 In Wayte, a
Presidential Proclamation directed that male citizens and cer-
tain male residents born during 1960 register with the Selective
Service during a specific week.218 Although the petitioner fell
within the designated class, he failed to register and instead
wrote letters to government officials stating that he did not reg-
ister and did not intend to do so.219 These letters were placed in
a Selective Service file which tracked other reported nonregis-
trants.220 Subsequently, the Selective Service adopted a policy
of selective enforcement under which it would only investigate
and prosecute those men whose names were in that file.221
Wayte claimed that he and others indicted were impermis-
sibly targeted for prosecution because they exercised their First
Amendment rights and were vocal in their opposition to the
draft.222 The Department of Justice recognized that those likely
to be prosecuted were the vocal opponents, and conceded that
the Department knew allegations such as the one made by
Wayte would be made.223 However, because a more active sys-
tem of enforcement was not available, the Department decided
to prosecute using the file to track all reported
nonregistrants. 224
The Supreme Court rejected Wayte's argument and found
that the Selective Service treated all nonregistrants simi-
larly.225 In evaluating Wayte's claim, the Court stated that se-
lective enforcement claims should be evaluated according to the
standards of equal protection,226 which requires the petitioner
to show that the statute had a discriminatory effect and that it
was motivated by a discriminatory purpose.227 The petitioner
217. 470 U.S. 598 (1984).
218. See id. at 601.
219. See id.
220. See id. This file included all men that made it known to the Selective
Service themselves that they did not register and those men made known by other
sources. See id.
221. See id.
222. See id. at 604.
223. See Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 603 (1984).
224. See id.
225. See id. at 610.
226. See id. at 608.
227. See Personnel Adm'r, 442 U.S. at 272.
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failed to show that the enforcement policy selected nonregis-
trants according to whether they spoke out about the process. 228
The evidence showed that while many of the men the govern-
ment prosecuted had been vocal in their opposition, the govern-
ment also prosecuted those who were reported but did not
protest.229 The Court acknowledged the broad discretion given
to prosecutors and reaffirmed that concept, recognizing that the
decision of whether or not to prosecute is "particularly ill-suited
[for] judicial review."230 "[Tihe strength of the case, the prosecu-
tion's general deterrence value, the Government's enforcement
priorities, and the case's relationship to the Government's over-
all enforcement plan are not readily susceptible to the kind of
analysis the courts are competent to undertake."23' Further, ju-
dicial supervision in this area would increase cost, cause delay,
threaten to chill law enforcement by subjecting the prosecutor's
motives and decision-making to outside inquiry, and could also
undermine the effectiveness of prosecutions by revealing the
government's enforcement policy. 232
It is in light of this history that the New York Legislature
enacted legislation providing for the death sentence in New
York. To be deemed constitutional such legislation must con-
form to the mandates derived from this history.
V. The New York Death Penalty Legislation
A. Purposes and Goals
On September 1, 1995, Governor George E. Pataki ap-
proved and signed into law death penalty legislation in New
York. 23 On approving the legislation Governor Pataki stated:
[Tihe citizens of New York State have spoken loudly and clearly
in their call for justice for those who commit the most serious of
crimes by depriving other citizens of their very lives. [They] ...
228. See Wayte, 470 U.S. at 609.
229. See id.
230. Id. at 607.
231. Id.
232. See id.
233. See Act of March 7, 1995, ch. 1, 1995 N.Y. Laws.
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are convinced the death penalty will deter these vicious crimes
and I, as their Governor agree. 23
The purpose of this legislation is to allow for the imposition of
the death penalty when a defendant is convicted for certain
types of intentional murder.235
In light of the Furman decision, such legislation must pro-
vide the jury with adequate guidance when they are called on to
sentence a first degree murderer.236 Prior New York death pen-
alty legislation was declared unconstitutional by the New York
Court of Appeals because it gave the jury the complete discre-
tion to decide whether to impose the death penalty on a defend-
ant.237 The Court of Appeals, citing Furman, reasoned that
such statutory discretion rendered the death penalty cruel and
unusual punishment.23 Governor Pataki assures that the infir-
mities in past New York legislation are avoided in the current
law which establishes a bifurcated trial procedure and sets
forth clear standards to narrow the scope of the death penalty
and to guide the jury in determining whether to impose it.239
B. The Provisions
1. Who is Subject to its Provisions
The death penalty legislation provides three options for
sentencing defendants convicted of first degree murder:240
death, life imprisonment without parole241 and an intermediate
234. Memorandum from Governor George E. Pataki approving L. 1995, ch. 1;
Death Penalty (Sept. 1, 1995).
235. See Bill Memorandum from the New York State Assembly, 218th Ses-
sion, 1995 Regular Session for L. 1995, ch. 1 (March 7, 1995).
236. See supra notes 73-75 and accompanying text.
237. See People v. Fitzpatrick, 346 N.Y.S.2d 793 (1973). N.Y. PENAL LAW
§ 125.35(5) (repealed 1974), provided that a defendant convicted of murder shall be
sentenced to death if, after another proceeding, the jury unanimously agreed to
impose such a penalty and the court was convinced that the victim was a peace
officer who was killed in the course of his official duties. If the jury unanimously
agreed to impose the death penalty the court was required to do so. See id.
238. See Fitzpatrick, 346 N.Y.S.2d at 802.
239. See Memorandum from Governor George E. Pataki, supra note 234.
240. See N.Y. PENAL LAw § 60.06 (McKinney Supp. 1996).
241. A defendant sentenced to life imprisonment without parole shall not be-
come eligible for parole or conditional release and is committed to the custody of
the state department of correctional services for the remainder of his life. See N.Y.
PENAL LAW § 70.00.
302 [Vol. 17:273
30http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol17/iss1/5
1996] NEW YORK DEATH PENALTY 303
sentence of regular life for a class A-I felony other than a sen-
tence of life imprisonment without parole.
242
The New York death penalty legislation specifically defines
the offenses which are subject to the punishment of death.243
First degree murder requires that a person intend to cause the
death of another person and in fact cause that death.2 "4 In addi-
tion to intent, the prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable
doubt 245 the elements of at least one of twelve statutorily de-
fined aggravating factors246 that render the defendant subject to
the death penalty.247 These aggravating circumstances include
the murder of a police officer, 2 8 a peace officer,249 an employee
of a local correctional facility,250 a judge,251 or a witness,252 or
the family member of a witness.253 In addition, a defendant is
subject to the death penalty if he murders while in a correc-
tional facility or while escaping from such a facility,254 or if he
murders while committing another serious felony.255 Contract
killers, 256 those who commit two or more murders within twenty
four months, 257 and those who have murdered before, 258 may
also receive the death penalty.259 Executions under this law
will be carried out by lethal injection 260 in a state prison. 26 1
242. See id. An intermediate sentence for an A-I felony is a minimum of
twenty to twenty five years and a maximum of life for defendants convicted of first
degree murder who are not sentenced to death or life imprisonment. See id.
243. See N.Y. PENAL LAw § 125.27.
244. See id.
245. See N.Y. CmiM. PRoc. LAW § 400.27(3) (McKinney Supp. 1996).
246. See id. This section defines the aggravating factors as each subpara-
graph of paragraph (a) of subdivision one of section 125.27 of the N.Y. Penal Law.
See id.
247. See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.27.
248. See id. § 125.27(a)(i).
249. See id. § 125.27(a)(ii).
250. See id. § 125.27(iii).
251. See id. § 125.27(xii).
252. See id. § 125.27(v).
253. See N.Y. PENAL LAw § 125.27(v) (McKinney Supp. 1996).
254. See id. § 125.27(iv).
255. See id. § 125.27(vii).
256. See id. § 125.27(vi).
257. See id. § 125.27(xi).
258. See id. § 125.27(ix).
259. See N.Y. PENAL LAw § 125.27 (McKinney Supp. 1996).
260. See N.Y. CoRREcT. LAw § 658 (McKinney Supp. 1996). Lethal injection
seems to be the least cruel method of capital punishment because there is little or
no mutilation of the body; the violence is limited to the insertion of a needle; the
31
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2. Sentencing Procedures
To protect the interests of a defendant in a capital case,
procedures have been established in order to assure the defend-
ant the full opportunity to defend his rights.262 One such proce-
dure is the requirement that the prosecution give the defendant
and the court adequate written notice of their intent to seek the
death penalty in a particular case.263 The people have 120 days
from the time of the defendant's arraignment to make such a
decision, 264 and if the notice is withdrawn it can not be refiled. 265
After notice is filed the defendant is given an additional sixty
days to file new motions or supplement motions pending before
the court.266 There are also pre-sentencing provisions protect-
ing the defendant from prejudice due to the personal beliefs of
the jurors.267 In any capital case, either party, upon motion,
may examine prospective jurors regarding their qualifications
as jurors, including the possibility of racial bias.26 The legisla-
ture also recognized that the personal opinions of the jurors re-
garding capital punishment may prejudice the defendant, so
any juror with opinions that make it impossible to render an
impartial decision on the sentence may be discharged by the
court.
2 6 9
The death penalty legislation sets forth procedures and
guidelines to aid the jury in determining the proper sentence for
a convicted murderer.270 When the prosecution seeks the death
penalty such determination is made at a separate sentencing
proceeding where the same jury that decided the defendant's
prisoner is given a barbiturate to kill the pain before the poison enters the body.
See Peter S. Adolf, Note, Killing Me Softly: Is the Gas Chamber, Or Any Other
Method of Execution, "Cruel and Unusual Punishment?", 22 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q.
815, 863-64 (1995).
261. See N.Y. CoaaEcr. LAW § 659.
262. See N.Y. CRIM. PRoc. LAW §§ 250.40, 270.16, 270.20 (McKinney Supp.
1996).
263. See id. § 250.40.
264. See id. § 250.40(1)-(2).
265. See id. § 250.40(4).
266. See id. § 250.40(3).
267. See id. §§ 270.16, 270.20.
268. See N.Y. CRiM PRoc. LAw § 270.16 (McKinney Supp. 1996).
269. See id. § 400.27(2).
270. See id. § 400.27(1).
[Vol. 17:273304
32http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol17/iss1/5
1996] NEW YORK DEATH PENALTY 305
guilt 271 decides whether the defendant is sentenced to death272
or life imprisonment without parole.273 If the prosecution does
not seek the death penalty, the court will sentence the defend-
ant without a separate sentencing proceeding.274
During a separate sentencing proceeding the jury may only
consider the aggravating factor or factors proven at trial beyond
a reasonable doubt by the prosecution.275 Those aggravating
factors established at trial are deemed to be established at the
separate sentencing proceeding and are not to be relitigated,276
except in rebuttal to any evidence relevant to a mitigating fac-
tor offered by the defendant at the sentencing proceeding. 277
The jury is also to consider several mitigating factors at the sen-
tencing proceeding including the defendant's history of violent
acts, the mental state of the defendant at the time of the crime,
the circumstances under which the crime was committed, the
degree of involvement by the defendant in the crime, the de-
fendant's use of drugs or alcohol at the time of the crime or any
other relevant circumstance regarding the defendant's state of
mind, character, background or record. 278 These mitigating fac-
271. See id. § 400.27(2).
272. A sentence of death should be imposed only when the jury finds unani-
mously that the aggravating factors substantially outweigh the mitigating factors,
and unanimously agree that the death sentence should be imposed. See id.
§ 400.27(11)(a).
273. See id. § 400.27(1).
274. See N.Y. CPM PRoc. LAW § 400.27(1) (McKinney Supp. 1996).
275. See id. § 400.27(3)(a).
276. See id.
277. See id. § 400.27(6) The defendant is not precluded from offering reliable
hearsay evidence and is to be given liberal opportunity to offer reliable evidence
that would otherwise by inadmissible. See Green v. Georgia, 442 U.S. 95 (1979).
278. See N.Y. CRIM. Paoc. LAW § 400.27(9). The statute provides as mitigating
factors: (a) whether the defendant has a significant history of prior criminal convic-
tions involving the use of violence against another person; (b) whether the defend-
ant was mentally retarded at the time of the crime, or his mental capacity was so
impaired or his ability to conform his conduct to the requirements of law was im-
paired but not so impaired in either case as to constitute a defense to prosecution;
(c) whether the defendant was under duress or the domination of another,
although not to such a point as to constitute a defense to prosecution; (d) whether
the defendant was criminally liable for the present offense of murder committed by
another, but his participation in the offense was relatively minor, although not so
minor as to constitute a defense; (e) whether the murder was committed while the
defendant was mentally or emotionally disturbed or under the influence of alcohol
or drugs, but not so minor as to constitute a defense; or (f) any other circumstance
concerning the crime, the defendant's state of mind or condition at the time of the
33
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tors must be proven by the defendant by a preponderance of the
evidence.27 9 At the conclusion of the trial for first degree mur-
der the court is to charge the jury that with respect to the mur-
der charge, they should consider whether or not to sentence the
defendant to death or life imprisonment without parole and
that a unanimous decision is required.280 In the event the jury
is unable to reach a unanimous conclusion, the court will sen-
tence the defendant to either life imprisonment without parole
or a term or imprisonment for the defendant's regular life.281
An analysis of this legislation can only be done by consider-
ing the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against "cruel and un-
usual punishments," the history of capital punishment, and the
Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of equal protection. To be
upheld as constitutional the New York legislation must conform
to the mandates of the Constitution and Supreme Court case
law.
VI. The Constitutionality of the New York Death Penalty
Historically, there has always been a concern that punish-
ments should fit the crime and be administered fairly and
equally among those deserving of the punishment. 28 2 The en-
actment of the Eighth Amendment provided a yardstick against
which the severity of punishments could be measured. The
New York death penalty legislation must be measured against
this constitutional yardstick before it can be rendered a valid
law. The Eighth Amendment is a clear mandate against the
infliction of unnecessary and barbaric punishments against any
criminal.28 The Supreme Court has recognized that although
capital punishment is permitted,284 the deliberate infliction of
crime, or the defendant's character, background or record that would be relevant to
mitigation or punishment for the crime. See id.
279. See id. §400.27(6). Any juror who finds a mitigating factor to have been
established by the defendant by a preponderance of the evidence may consider
such factor regardless of whether the jury unanimously agrees. See id.
§ 400.27(11)(a).
280. See id. § 400.27(10).
281. See id.
282. See supra notes 25-31 and accompanying text.
283. See supra notes 32-33 and accompanying text.
284. See supra notes 38-48, 98-102 and accompanying text.
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unnecessary pain is not.285 Therefore, any punishment, includ-
ing the death penalty, must be within civilized standards of so-
ciety, 28 6 and proportional to the severity of the crime. 287
A. The Level of Civility
The New York Legislature has enacted a law providing for
the death penalty in certain cases of first degree murder and
has done so with the support of Governor Pataki and the pub-
lic. 2s8 The enactment of the death penalty in New York came
after many years without such legislation.29 The election of
Governor Pataki, an outspoken supporter of the death penalty,
is indicative of the mindset of New Yorkers: that to combat the
growing problem of violent crimes in our society, a measure as
drastic as the death penalty is necessary. The people of New
York have spoken, through their legislature, and that voice rep-
resents society's endorsement of capital punishment as a proper
form of punishment. Simply because such legislation has been
enacted does not assure that it is within the limits of the Consti-
tution. The New York legislation must be applied in an even-
handed manner to ensure its validity.290
The historical use of capital punishment 291 and the stan-
dards of civility in our society292 must be considered when decid-
ing the constitutionality of a death penalty statute.293 The New
York legislation provides for the use of lethal injection to ad-
minister the death penalty.294 The punishment of death has
been long recognized as proportional to the crime of murder, 295
therefore the remaining question is whether the method em-
ployed is within civilized standards and does not inflict unnec-
essary pain.296 The method of lethal injection will be upheld
because it does not inflict unnecessary or wanton pain. In fact,
285. See supra notes 32-33.
286. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
287. See supra notes 51-53.
288. See supra notes 233-35.
289. See supra note 237 and accompanying text.
290. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
291. See supra Part II.C.
292. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
293. See supra Part II.B.
294. See supra note 260 and accompanying text.
295. See supra notes 38-48 and accompanying text.
296. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
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efforts are made to minimize the pain of the prisoner by ad-
ministering pain killing drugs before the injection.297 Such ef-
forts are made in order to end the prisoner's life in the most
humane, peaceful and civilized manner possible.
Although the method employed meets the test under the
Eighth Amendment, it is still necessary that the New York
Death penalty legislation meet the constitutional mandate of
Furman v. Georgia.298 Although prior to the Furman decision it
was considered constitutional for juries to decide whether to im-
pose the death penalty without guidance and according to their
own feelings and beliefs,299 such discretion is no longer af-
forded.300 In Furman, the Supreme Court held that it is uncon-
stitutional to give juries unguided discretion when they
sentence a capital defendant to death30 1 because such discretion
affords juries the opportunity to discriminate against certain
defendants for arbitrary reasons. 30 2 Therefore, in order to meet
the constitutional requirement of Furman, the New York legis-
lation must provide guidance to juries that will prevent the
death penalty from being imposed arbitrarily.30 3
In Gregg, the Supreme Court approved a Georgia death
penalty statute which narrowed the class of murderers subject
to the death penalty by requiring at least one aggravating factor
to be proven beyond a reasonable doubt.30 4 Because the jury
was required to consider the circumstances of the crime and the
characteristics of the criminal, the defendant was protected
from arbitrary sentences.305 The Gregg court specifically en-
dorsed statutes that provide for bifurcated proceedings, consist-
ing of a guilt phase and a sentencing phase, where the jury is
given all the relevant information, and guidance on how to use
it.306
297. See supra note 260.
298. See supra notes 69-85 and accompanying text.
299. See supra notes 63-68 and accompanying text.
300. See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
301. See supra notes 69-73 and accompanying text.
302. See supra notes 74-81 and accompanying text.
303. See supra notes 74-81 and accompanying text.
304. See supra notes 89-97 and accompanying text.
305. See supra notes 89-92 and accompanying text.
306. See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
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In conformity with Furman and Gregg the New York legis-
lation contains several provisions for checking jury discretion.
First, the legislation provides for three possible sentences for
defendants who fit the statutory prerequisites.307 Therefore,
the sentence is not mandatory and the jury still maintains some
discretion. However, this discretion does not permit the jury to
sentence defendants to death who do not fit the strict statutory
definition. This specific and narrow definition of what crimes
are subject to the death penalty means that a jury cannot ran-
domly decide to impose it, or fail to impose it, in cases where
their own prejudices come into play. Additionally, prospective
jurors can be questioned regarding any possible prejudices they
may entertain which would prevent them from rendering an im-
partial decision regarding a sentence.308
Second, a separate sentencing proceeding is provided,
where the jury who decided the defendant's guilt also decides
his sentence.3°9 This assures that the jury is aware of all the
relevant facts that are necessary to correctly decide the fate of a
defendant. The separate sentencing proceeding allows the jury
to consider only those aggravating factors the jury unanimously
agreed were proven beyond a reasonable doubt.310 Mitigating
factors may be considered by the jury, if proven by a preponder-
ance by the defendant, even if the jury is not unanimous in be-
lieving such factor was proven.311 This allows for mercy for
defendants who convince even one juror that the mitigating fac-
tors outweigh the aggravating factors. The jury's decision re-
garding the sentence must be unanimous and if they fail to
reach such a decision, the court has the power to take the case
from the jury and sentence the defendant to life or a term of
imprisonment for the defendant's regular life.31 2
The above provisions guide the jury in making their deci-
sion and do not leave all aspects of the decision to their own
discretion. Therefore, the New York death penalty law is con-
stitutional in light of Furman.313 The decision whether or not to
307. See supra notes 240-42 and accompanying text.
308. See supra notes 268-69 and accompanying text.
309. See supra notes 271-73 and accompanying text.
310. See supra note 275 and accompanying text.
311. See supra notes 278-79 and accompanying text.
312. See supra note 281 and accompanying text.
313. See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
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sentence a defendant to death depends on whether the prosecu-
tor seeks such a sentence, whether an aggravating factor exists
and whether the jury can reach a unanimous decision. The leg-
islation enumerates specific circumstances for the jury to con-
sider in deciding a sentence and does not leave the jury to
depend on their own feelings and prejudices in sentencing a
capital defendant. The New York statute mirrors the statute
approved by the Supreme Court in Gregg v. Georgia314 and
would therefore meet the standards required by Furman1 5 and
Gregg.316
B. Its Equality as Applied
Initially, the Fourteenth Amendment's interpretation fo-
cused solely on alleviating the racial prejudice that the newly
freed slaves endured. 317 This purpose extended to each of
the Amendment's provisions, including the Equal Protection
Clause. This clause restrains the use of classifications based on
any criteria and therefore covers an area broader than just
race. 318 The Equal Protection Clause requires that if a classifi-
cation is made, it must consist of similarly situated people who
should be, and are, treated similarly.319
Subjecting murderers in one New York county to the death
penalty but excluding murderers in another county from the
same punishment creates a classification that the Equal Protec-
tion Clause prohibits. The broad applicability of the Clause to
classifications based on any discriminating criteria establishes
that it must also encompass discrimination based on where a
person is prosecuted for a crime. The Equal Protection Clause
guarantees that every person receive equal treatment under the
laws, unless a unique difference requires different treatment.320
No form of discrimination is acceptable under this constitu-
tional provision, including classifications based on geographical
differences.
314. See supra notes 89-93 and accompanying text.
315. See supra Part III.B.
316. See supra Part III.B.
317. See supra note 116 and accompanying text.
318. See supra notes 125-26 and accompanying text.
319. See supra note 127 and accompanying text.
320. See supra notes 122, 127 and accompanying text.
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The New York death penalty legislation classifies all first
degree murderers who meet at least one aggravating factor to-
gether. They are similarly situated in the fact that they have
all committed a crime that makes them subject to the death
penalty. When these similarly situated. people are treated dif-
ferently, due to the policies of the district attorneys, the Equal
Protection Clause is violated.
1. The Prima Facie Case
The Castaneda three-factor standard establishes a prima
facie case of an equal protection violation for a capital defend-
ant.321 The defendant must first establish that he is a member
of a distinct group that is singled out for different treatment.
322
A capital defendant could establish this by showing that he is a
member of the group of first degree murderers who face the
death penalty and is therefore treated differently from other
first degree murderers who do not face death. Second, the capi-
tal defendant must show a substantial amount of differential
treatment.32 There can be no argument that losing your life for
committing a crime is significantly different than serving time
in prison. Therefore, a capital defendant challenging a district
attorney's enforcement of the death penalty could also meet this
standard. The final factor is that the allegedly discriminatory
process is susceptible to abuse or is not racially neutral.
324
Whenever one person is responsible for making decisions there
is the significant possibility that their individual prejudices will
play a role in that process. 325 If district attorneys are permitted
to make policy decisions, based on personal beliefs, they cease to
answer to anyone else and can freely abuse the process at will.
District attorneys work for the people of New York and when
they ignore the laws, they ignore the people, and abuse the of-
fice. In order to be successful in such a constitutional challenge
a capital defendant must prove that the different treatment
321. See supra notes 136-40 and accompanying text.
322. See supra note 137 and accompanying text.
323. See supra note 138 and accompanying text.
324. See supra note 139 and accompanying text.
325. See supra notes 202-07 and accompanying text.
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given to capital defendants is the result of purposeful
discrimination.326
2. Proving the Case
The capital defendant has many methods to prove pur-
poseful discrimination by the district attorneys, and can do so
using circumstantial or direct evidence. 327 A good starting point
is to see whether the challenged action bears a greater burden
on one group over another.3 28 In the scenario presented in this
comment it is clear that those charged with first degree murder
in counties where the death penalty is sought are clearly bear-
ing a greater burden than those who murder in counties where
death is not sought. In the former case, the defendants face los-
ing their lives, while in the latter case the risk is only freedom.
However, this unequal burden is only a starting point in estab-
lishing purposeful discrimination.
The Supreme Court listed several methods of proving dis-
crimination in Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan
Housing Development Corp.,329 some of which are useful in the
present challenge. The New York legislation provides 120 days
for the prosecutor to decide whether to seek the death penalty
in a particular case.330 Failure to utilize this time and fully con-
sider the individual circumstances of each case is a departure
from the law and the normal procedure that is followed by other
district attorneys. 331 A capital defendant may also utilize the
legislative history of the New York legislation and the state-
ments of the Governor and other leaders in New York State to
show that the law is being executed in a discriminating man-
ner.332 Clearly, the law was enacted to be implemented and not
to be ignored or in effect repealed at the whim of district attor-
neys. The purpose of the statute is being ignored by district at-
torneys who fail to consider it in applicable cases and therefore
the law is being applied unequally.
326. See supra note 128 and accompanying text.
327. See supra note 141 and accompanying text.
328. See supra note 142 and accompanying text.
329. See supra notes 129, 145-49 and accompanying text.
330. See supra notes 263-65 and accompanying text.
331. See supra note 148 and accompanying text.
332. See supra note 149 and accompanying text. See also supra notes 20-22
and accompanying text.
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Although McClesky severely limited the use of statistics in
capital sentencing cases based on race, it does not effect the
present challenge in the same way. The McClesky court
acknowledged that statistics may be used to show purposeful
discrimination when they pertain to certain limited considera-
tions.3-3 Therefore, statistics may provide evidence of pur-
poseful discrimination if they show that the actions of the
district attorney in deciding not to pursue the death penalty
had a direct discriminatory effect on a defendant who faces the
death penalty.
a. The Case of Facial Discrimination
A statute may discriminate in several different ways, one
being when the very words of the statute are discriminatory.
Strauder v. West Virginia illustrates one such type of facially
discriminatory statute.334 However, Strauder is inapplicable to
the challenge considered in this Comment because the New
York death penalty legislation does not classify defendants
based on any impermissible criteria. It treats all first degree
murderers who fall within the statutory prerequisites in the
same way and this classification is permissible because they are
similar situated. It is not until a member of that similar class is
treated differently that an equal protection violation surfaces.
As in Snowden, where it was permissible to discriminate be-
tween successful and unsuccessful candidates in an election,335
it is similarly permissible to discriminate between those who fit
the first degree murder statutory prerequisites and those
criminals who do not. In each case it is proper to treat the two
groups differently, because they are different. Therefore, the
New York legislation is not facially discriminatory.
b. The Case of Enactments with the Purpose to
Discriminate
However, further analysis of the New York legislation must
be done to see whether it violates the Equal Protection Clause
because it was enacted with the purpose to discriminate. A dis-
criminatory purpose implies that the decisionmaker selected a
333. See supra note 158 and accompanying text.
334. See supra notes 164-71 and accompanying text.
335. See supra notes 172-77 and accompanying text.
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course of conduct, at least partly because of its adverse effects
on an identifiable group.3 36 This New York death penalty stat-
ute was enacted to subject all individuals who intentionally
take the life of another, under certain enumerated circum-
stances, to the punishment of death. It was not the intention of
the New York Legislature-the decisionmaker-to enact a stat-
ute that would only apply to certain counties in New York. If
such intent existed, the legislature would have expressly so pro-
vided. It was not so provided because such a provision would
render the law facially discriminatory and unconstitutional.
c. The Case of Discrimination Through Enforcement
A capital defendant who wishes to challenge the constitu-
tionality of the New York death penalty legislation would be
successful in arguing that it violates the Equal Protection
Clause because it is enforced in an arbitrary manner by the dis-
trict attorneys. In Yick Wo, the Supreme Court found that the
San Francisco Board of Supervisor's authority to grant or with-
hold consent to maintain a laundry was arbitrarily exercised
without guidance, and at the will of the Board members.33 7 The
effect was to create two separate classes of similarly situated
people: those who wanted to operate a laundry and were
granted consent, and those who wanted to operate a laundry
and were refused consent. 3 8 The statute granting such discre-
tion to the Board was held to violate the Equal Protection
Clause because it was applied unequally by public officials and
resulted in unjust and illegal discriminations between similarly
situated people. 339
Yick Wo is analogous to the situation presented in this
Comment. When district attorneys arbitrarily decide to enforce
a statute according to their own policies, they create two
classes, those who are subject to the death penalty and may re-
ceive it, and those who are subject to the death penalty and will
not receive it. Here, as in Yick Wo, public officials are unequally
applying a law and creating unjust and illegal discriminations
based on where a person is prosecuted for a crime. This differ-
336. See supra note 188 and accompanying text.
337. See supra notes 197-98 and accompanying text.
338. See supra note 198 and accompanying text.
339. See supra note 199 and accompanying text.
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ent treatment of similarly situated people is the very type of
classification that the Equal Protection Clause was meant to
prohibit.
Claims of discrimination through enforcement are difficult
to prove because of the broad discretion the government is given
in deciding whom to prosecute. 340 Clearly, the district attorneys
do not have to seek the death penalty in every case of first de-
gree murder because the mitigating factors in a particular case
may make seeking the death penalty futile.341 It is not argued
that district attorneys are not permitted to exercise their judg-
ment and choose not to seek the death penalty in a particular
case. But, this discretion creates a problem when it is exercised
in a manner that is inconsistent with the Constitution. In Oyler
v. Boles, the Supreme Court was faced with a case where the
prosecutor failed to seek a mandatory sentence for a habitual
criminal in all the cases where it was applicable.3 2 The Court
found that although the statute was not applied in all the cases
where it could have been, it was not due to discrimination, but
to the unavailability of police records and a lack of knowledge
on the part of the prosecutors.
Oyler is distinguishable from the equal protection claim in
this comment because the district attorneys are deciding not to
seek the death penalty before the relevant information is even
provided to them. Only the existence of an intentional murder
and an aggravating factor is necessary to seek the death pen-
alty. These factors depend on information that is readily avail-
able for the district attorney's consideration. While it is true
that the conscious exercise of some selectivity in enforcement is
not a constitutional violation,3 3 selectivity which puts personal
policy above the law cannot be valid. The legislation provides
120 days344 so the district attorneys can carefully consider each
case and proceed according to their judgment. To ignore that
provision is to ignore the law and is an abuse of power.
340. See supra notes 203-07 and accompanying text.
341. See supra notes 202-07 and accompanying text.
342. See supra notes 208-16 and accompanying text.
343. See supra note 216.
344. See supra note 264 and accompanying text.
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Wayte v. United States3 45 presents another equal protection
case against which to measure the challenge presented in this
comment. In Wayte, the Supreme Court found that the selective
prosecution system employed by the Selective Service to deal
with people who did not register was not based on impermissi-
ble discrimination. 346 Although nonregistrants who were vocal
in their opposition to the registration requirement were prose-
cuted, so were other men who failed to register and were not
vocal in their opposition. 347 Therefore, the Court found that the
system treated all nonregistrants equally.348
Wayte, like Oyler, differs from a capital defendant's claim
that his equal protection rights are violated by the district at-
torneys selectively seeking the death penalty. Again, the selec-
tivity in Wayte was due to the availability of information, the
names of nonregistrants, 349 and not to the arbitrary policies of
prosecutors. The prosecutors in Wayte had no choice to operate
this selective enforcement policy because they could not prose-
cute people they did not know were in violation of the statute.
The selectivity in enforcement at issue in this Comment is due
to individual policy choices, not to the absence of information.
There will be people who commit murder in the first degree who
avoid the death sentence. However, this should occur only after
the prosecutor weighs the strength of his case and considers all
of the aggravating and mitigating factors and decides not to
seek the death penalty, or a jury decides on a different sentence.
Prosecutors are allowed 120 days to weigh the facts of each par-
ticular capital case and to make a well reasoned decision re-
garding the sentence to seek. The problem arises when the
district attorneys simply disregard the law and refuse to con-
sider the facts of any case because they have personally decided
that the death penalty is not proper punishment. There is no
question that guidance is provided to the district attorneys
under the New York legislation. The issue is whether they up-
345. See supra note 217.
346. See supra notes 228-32 and accompanying text.
347. See supra notes 228-29 and accompanying text.
348. See supra note 225 and accompanying text.
349. See supra notes 223-24 and accompanying text.
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hold their duty, required of them by their oath,350 to contem-
plate the death penalty in cases in which it is applicable.
VII. Conclusion
Wielding the power to end a person's life is without ques-
tion an awesome responsibility. It should only be utilized when
the factors of a case are carefully considered and a fair determi-
nation is made that justice requires the punishment of death.
The nature of this punishment carries with it a troublesome de-
bate over whether anyone should have the power to end another
person's life. The death penalty has been an accepted method of
punishment for hundreds of years and New York has docu-
mented its support of it through its recent legislation. The leg-
islation puts the power to end another's life in the hands of both
the district attorney and a jury, who decide this ultimate ques-
tion after thoroughly considering all the relevant factors of a
case. Absent from the death penalty legislation is the sentence
that says that the decision of who is executed and who is not is
for the district attorneys alone to decide. District attorneys are
required to faithfully execute the laws of the State of New York,
including the death penalty law. There simply is no room for
the intrusion of personal beliefs and opinions in meeting this
requirement. Enforcement of a blanket policy, which effectively
nullifies the enactment of the law and elevates personal policy
above that law, cannot be accepted as merely an effect of
prosecutorial discretion.
The Constitution of the United States guarantees all people
equal treatment under the laws. The laws of New York should
apply to all people in New York, not just to those whom the dis-
trict attorneys decide the laws should apply. When the New
York Legislature enacted a death penalty statute it failed to
provide a section making the entire law subject to the individ-
ual policies of district attorneys. It failed to provide this section
because it did not intend the district attorneys to have such
power. If New York is to have a constitutional death penalty
statute it must apply to all who fall under its provisions. It is
not being argued that the death sentence should be mandatory,
only that it should be fairly and uniformly applied. If it is ap-
350. See supra notes 14-15.
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plied arbitrarily, according to the district attorneys' policies, it
will be struck down as unconstitutional as a violation of the
Equal Protection Clause.
Kerry E. Ford*
* This article is dedicated to my mother and father for their endless support.
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